Grafana

Grafana's data source proxy did not apply role-based access control to write requests forwarded to Loki data sources. A user holding only the Viewer role on an affected Grafana instance could send POST, PUT and DELETE requests through the proxy to the Loki rules API (/loki/api/v1/rules), allowing them to create, modify and delete Loki alerting rules. Because those rules are stored by Loki rather than by Grafana, the change took effect for every user of that Loki data source, not only for the Viewer who made the request. Exploitation requires an authenticated Viewer account on the Grafana instance and a configured Loki data source; no other privileges are needed. Both Grafana OSS and Grafana Enterprise are affected. The defect is in Grafana's data source proxy; Loki itself is not vulnerable and does not need to be patched.

Grafana OSS and Grafana Enterprise did not safely resolve symbolic links when extracting plugin archives. A crafted plugin archive can chain relative symbolic link entries to escape the plugin installation directory, writing arbitrary files and an executable backend binary outside that directory. The dropped executable runs with the privileges of the Grafana server process, resulting in remote code execution. Plugin archives are extracted before their signature is verified, so a valid plugin signature does not prevent the write. An operator can therefore be affected by installing a plugin that appears legitimate, as well as by installing a plugin from an arbitrary archive using grafana-cli, the GF_INSTALL_PLUGINS environment variable, or preinstall configuration. Grafana Enterprise is affected because it includes the same plugin extraction code as Grafana OSS.

A stored cross-site scripting vulnerability in the Geomap panel's MapLibre base layer allows a user with the Editor role to execute arbitrary JavaScript in another user's session by hosting a malicious style configuration, enabling escalation to Org Admin.

Only self-managed Grafana instances with Auth Proxy authentication and identity caching enabled (sync_ttl greater than zero) are affected. The Auth Proxy cache key concatenated the username and forwarded identity attributes without a delimiter, so distinct identities could collide on one key. An authenticated user who shapes their own attributes to collide with a higher-privileged user's, while that user's cache entry is live, is authenticated as that user, up to Administrator (authentication bypass by spoofing).

An authenticated user with permission to create or edit alert rules can bypass datasource query authorization by marking an alert rule query as a server-side expression while referencing a real datasource UID (incorrect authorization). This can expose data accessible through Grafana's configured datasource credentials to users who lack permission to query that datasource.

When using an IPv6 allow-list for the Auth Proxy feature, it defaults to /32 addresses. Addresses specifying a mask explicitly are not affected; to mitigate easily, add the desired mask (usually /128) to the addresses. Only auth proxy is affected; Okta, SAML, LDAP, etc are unaffected here.

An Editor can overwrite a dashboard not owned by them to acquire admin on that specific dashboard. The user must have write access to the dashboard to escalate privilege.

A chained attack via SQL Expressions and a Grafana Enterprise plugin can lead to a remote arbitrary code execution impact (RCE). This is enabled by a feature in Grafana (OSS), so all users are always recommended to update to avoid future attack vectors going this path. Only instances with the sqlExpressions feature toggle enabled are vulnerable. Only instances in the following version ranges are affected: - 11.6.0 (inclusive) to 11.6.14 (exclusive): 11.6.14 has the fix. 11.5 and below are not affected. - 12.0.0 (inclusive) to 12.1.10 (exclusive): 12.1.10 has the fix. 12.0 did not receive an update, as it is end-of-life. - 12.2.0 (inclusive) to 12.2.8 (exclusive): 12.2.8 has the fix. - 12.3.0 (inclusive) to 12.3.6 (exclusive): 12.3.6 has the fix. - 12.4.0 (inclusive) to 12.4.2 (exclusive): 12.4.2 has the fix. 13.0.0 and above also have the fix: no v13 release is affected.

Every uncached /avatar/:hash request spawns a goroutine that refreshes the Gravatar image. If the refresh sits in the 10-slot worker queue longer than three seconds, the handler times out and stops listening for the result, so that goroutine blocks forever trying to send on an unbuffered channel. Sustained traffic with random hashes keeps tripping this timeout, so goroutine count grows linearly, eventually exhausting memory and causing Grafana to crash on some systems.

SCIM provisioning was introduced in Grafana Enterprise and Grafana Cloud in April to improve how organizations manage users and teams in Grafana by introducing automated user lifecycle management. In Grafana versions 12.x where SCIM provisioning is enabled and configured, a vulnerability in user identity handling allows a malicious or compromised SCIM client to provision a user with a numeric externalId, which in turn could allow to override internal user IDs and lead to impersonation or privilege escalation. This vulnerability applies only if all of the following conditions are met: - `enableSCIM` feature flag set to true - `user_sync_enabled` config option in the `[auth.scim]` block set to true