Rocket.Chat

Rocket.Chat in versions <8.5.1, <8.4.4, <8.3.6, <8.2.6, <8.1.6, <8.0.7, <7.13.9, and <7.10.13 is vulnerable to unauthenticated file deletion. The deleteFileMessage Meteor method permanently deletes any uploaded file by ID without requiring authentication. When called via an unauthenticated DDP WebSocket connection, Meteor.userId() returns null, causing the authorization check to be skipped. Execution falls through to FileUpload.getStore('Uploads').deleteById(fileID), which removes the file from storage and database unconditionally. File IDs are discoverable from public channel message payloads and download URLs.

Rocket.Chat versions <8.5.1, 8.4.4, 8.3.6, 8.2.6, 8.1.6, 8.0.7, 7.13.9, 7.10.13 has an access control vulnerability in Livechat files. Protected file downloads at /file-upload/:fileId/:name authorize livechat access using rc_room_type=l with rc_rid+rc_token, but the authorization path does not verify that rc_rid matches the requested file's rid. Furthermore, :fileId is predictable via sequential MongoDB IDs, and :name can be anything, allowing unauthenticated discovery of all uploaded files.

The Rocket.Chat DDP method autoTranslate.translateMessage in versions <8.5.0, <8.4.2, <8.3.4, <8.2.4, <8.1.5, <8.0.5, <7.13.8, and <7.10.12 accepts a client-supplied IMessage object and passes it directly to translateMessage() without checking Meteor.userId() or verifying room membership. Any authenticated DDP user can read the content of any message by ID from any room (private channels, DMs, E2EE rooms) by calling this method.

In Rocket.Chat <8.3.0, <8.2.1, <8.1.2, <8.0.3, <7.13.5, <7.12.6, <7.11.6, and <7.10.9, a NoSQL injection vulnerability can lead to account takeover of the first user with a generated token when an OAuth app is configured.